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ABSTRACT 
 
 Increasingly criminal justice agencies are integrating “data based” approaches into their 
operational strategies.   This “new” model of criminal justice suggests that analysis of data on 
recent crime and violence incidents can lead to a more focused and targeted effort than previous 
enforcement efforts.  Through such efforts, individuals, groups, and locations that exhibit a high 
level of gun violence within a limited geographic area are identified and a variety of intervention 
are then implemented.  These interventions typically include both enforcement as well as 
offender focused interventions.  These efforts differ from prior enforcement strategies in that 
they emphasize the integration of a problem analysis component in which data analysis is used to 
identify the patterns of gun violence in a small target area and enforcement resources are 
concentrated in this area.   
 
However, this approach also differs from previous “crackdown” enforcement strategies in that 
there are also community and offender intervention components that are integral to this model.  
The community component seeks to identify ways in which the community can be involved in 
working with law enforcement to reduce gun violence in this area.  This is often through 
increased community meetings, and establishing more frequent and effective means of 
communication between the community and local law enforcement.   
 
In addition, the enforcement strategies used in this model are data and intelligence driven.  As 
such they are focused on identifying the most problematic locations, groups and individuals that 
are most responsible for gun violence in this community.   
 
This report documents the implementation and outcomes of the implementation of Project Safe 
Neighborhoods in one of the jurisdictions in which this model was first implemented.  
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Executive Summary 
 
 In recent years there has been a movement emphasizing increasing use of analytical 
techniques in the design and operation of crime and violence reduction strategies.  These 
innovative approaches are often termed strategic problem solving.  These models typically 
include partnerships with various law enforcement and correctional agencies along with 
community or neighborhood alliances working together to identify the most serious aspects of 
the local violence problem.  Subsequent to this problem identification, a coordinated multi-
agency and community involved strategy was designed to focus intensive enforcement and 
intervention efforts on the locations, individuals, and groups that are principally responsible for 
this problem.   Project Safe Neighborhoods represented a major effort and commitment from the 
Department of Justice to address gun and violent crime through this innovative approach.   
The Project Safe Neighborhoods initiative was implemented in each of the Federal 
Judicial Districts through a multiagency task force which included members from local, state, 
and federal law enforcement along with representatives from correctional agencies particularly 
probation and parole.  Further, the community was to be significantly involved though 
coordinated outreach, intervention, and prevention project components.   
There were five key principals of the Project Safe Neighborhoods model. 
• Partnerships – collaborative relationships involving a partnership with other law 
enforcement and criminal justice agencies as well as social service agencies and 
community groups.   In addition, each task force had a research partner as well. 
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• Strategic Plan – PSN involves a problem solving process focused on identifying 
the most serious areas and groups for focused enforcement, intervention, and 
prevention activities.   
• Training - Extensive training was provided to task forces in a variety of topics 
including strategic problem solving, firearms law enforcement, gun prosecution, 
and community outreach strategies.    
• Outreach – PSN involved various outreach efforts to spread the deterrent message 
of “hard time for gun crime” to the intended audience. 
• Accountability – PSN was based on delivering a strong message of accountability 
to violent and gun offenders regarding the consequence of their continued 
involvement in gun crime.  In addition, each district had to track its progress on 
several standardized measures and report these results to the Department of 
Justice.  (McGarrell, 2005)  
Each district participating in Project Safe Neighborhoods was required to identify a 
specify area for the intervention.  Typically these “target” areas were those that had experienced 
among the highest level of gun violence in the jurisdiction.  
In addition, to this task force model, a characteristic that was to distinguish this approach 
from previous crime control strategies was that it was to be “data driven”.   Working closely with 
a research partner as well as law enforcement crime analysts, the Project Safe Neighborhoods 
task force was to design interventions that were consistent with focusing intensive efforts on the 
most problematic locations and offenders.   
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This report focuses on the implementation and operation of this project in one 
jurisdiction.  This jurisdiction had previously participated in the Strategic Approaches to 
Community Safety Initiative (SACSI), a precursor to Project Safe Neighborhoods.  This prior 
initiative followed similar principles regarding focused and targeted interventions and thus this 
jurisdiction was well suited to implement an intervention that coincided with the principals of 
Project Safe Neighborhoods.   
The evaluation of this project was presented with many and significant challenges.  In 
particular there were significant changes in the intervention throughout the study period. These 
changes included line personnel as well as law enforcement leadership.   
 These changes resulted in a variation in the level of intensity across the project period.  
In addition, at times during the project there were personnel changes that also resulted in 
different perspectives and commitment to the principles of the PSN initiative. However, the time 
frame for analysis presented in this report, is from the period of time in which there was the most 
consistent intervention of the PSN project principles.   
Two aspects of this initiative were identified for analysis as representing the project 
components that were most consistently in operation during the project period.  These were the 
case review component and the overall effect of this set of interventions on gun violence.    
Case/ Incident Reviews   
One of the core components of Project Safe Neighborhoods is the case (or incident) 
review process (Klofas, J and N. Hipple, et. al., 2006).  In this project component, individual 
criminal cases are systematically reviewed by not only prosecutors but also police officers who 
are part of the PSN enforcement team.  These latter individuals have significant street knowledge 
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about the gun violence situation as well as the role of various individuals and groups with regard 
to gun violence in the target area.   
At these meetings the characteristics of each arrest in the target area for an offense 
involving a firearm is reviewed by not only the state and federal prosecutors assigned to the unit 
but also by all members of the PSN enforcement team (typically a sergeant/ squad leader and 5-6 
officers assigned to this unit along with representatives from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tax, and 
Firearms (ATF), and the state and federal prosecutors assigned to this initiative. Typically this 
involves a discussion not just of the details of the current incident and arrest, but also of the 
offender and his/her role in the gun violence situation in the target area or jurisdiction.  Based on 
this discussion a determination of prosecution venue (state or federal) is made.  However an 
equally important aspect of these reviews is the discussion of the incident and the role of the 
offender in drug distribution as well as involvement with guns and violence in the target area/ 
jurisdiction.   In addition, intelligence regarding guns and violence that was obtained from a 
systematic debriefing of the arrestee is discussed.  Thus while the manifest purpose of these 
meetings is to determine prosecution venue, an equally important aspect is the discussion of the 
gun/gang violence aspects of this individual and his group and the potential impact of 
prosecution of this case in state versus federal court.   
Analysis was conducted on the case review process looking at the changes that occurred 
in how Carrying Concealed Weapons (CCW) cases were handled in 2006 and after the 
implementation of PSN in 2007.  These dates do not coincide with exactly the implementation 
dates as project implementation occurred over a period of time and experienced frequent 
personnel changes until it became stabilized in late 2006 and early 2007.  If PSN was working as 
intended we would expect that there would be a tightening of the case processing that would 
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result in fewer cases being dismissed and an increase in federal prosecution.  Arrest data were 
obtained for CCW arrests that were made in the target area and these cases were then matched 
with the case prosecution filings with the court.   
Analysis of these data over the two time periods, before and during the PSN intervention, 
indicated that the probability of charges being filed for a Carrying a Concealed Weapon offense 
did substantially rise over this period of time.  In 2006, 46% of the CCW arrests were filed in 
court compared to 59% of the cases in the 2007.  This is most likely due to the increased focus 
and systematic review of these cases along with the increased cooperation between the law 
enforcement and prosecution agencies during this period.     
Thus, relative to the initial research question, there does appear to be a substantial 
increase in the likelihood of sanction for weapons possession offenses under the PSN model.  A 
second consideration is did this increase in sanctions result in a decline in gun violence during 
this period of increased enforcement focus on gun possession offenses.    
Impact on Gun Violence 
Data were obtained for all non-fatal shootings and homicides for the period of January 1, 
2006 through the week of March 23, 2008.  From these data, a file was created for weekly total 
of shooting victimizations in each of six patrol districts.  Another district had implemented a 
different violence intervention program at various times during the study period and was 
excluded from this analysis.  A total of 117 weekly observations were recorded from each 
district.  Thirty-nine weeks between October 1, 2006 and June 30, 2007 constituted the 
intervention period.   
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Thus there were three different periods of time used for this analysis. A 39 week period 
between January 1, 2006 through September 24th, 2006 constitutes the pre project period.  The 
period of time between July 1, 2007 and March 23rd, 2008 represents the post PSN observation 
period.    
There were three sets of analyses that were conducted on these data.  First, a simple 
descriptive analysis describes the mean levels of gun violence in the intervention and non-
intervention areas over the entire project period.  Second, t-tests comparing the mean levels of 
gun violence across time periods provides insight into whether there were significant changes 
within the project area and if there were similar changes in other areas.  Third, ARIMA analyses 
were conducted to examine the trends over time in each of these areas.  
The initial analyses presented the mean number of shooting each week in the three 
different time periods; the Pre-PSN period, the PSN intervention period, and the post-PSN 
period.  Comparisons were then made for each patrol area for each of these time periods.   The 
district in which PSN was implemented had a reduction of 1.4 shooting victimizations per week 
compared to the pre-intervention period.  During the post project period, shootings again 
increased, but not to the pre-project level.   A series of t-tests revealed that the decline in fatal 
and non-fatal shootings was significant in the project period, while changes in other districts 
were not.  However, analysis that included the post project period indicated that there was a 
decay of these effects over time to eventually return to near pre- intervention levels.  It is 
important to note that when the project was operating at its peak levels of intensity, that there 
was on average a reduction over this 39 week period of one shooting per week.   
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The overall conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that the PSN gun initiative 
over the 39 weeks of observation had a small but statistically significant effect in reducing gun 
violence in this area.  There was no similar pattern of shootings during this time in other areas of 
this jurisdiction.  This suggests that there was a decline in gunshot victimization in the PSN area 
during the time that this project was most active.  However, it also demonstrates the difficulty of 
maintaining these reductions after intensive enforcement activity.   
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Introduction 
 
Criminal justice agencies are increasingly working towards interdependent and 
cooperative relationships to combat crime.  Partnerships among agencies and external 
collaborators such as Universities have begun to characterize routines across many local criminal 
justice systems (Klofas, McGarrell & Hipple, 2010).  The intensity, duration, and effectiveness 
of these partnerships is an important element for consideration in crafting new criminal justice 
innovations.   More precisely, programmatic efforts to measure how criminal justice works 
together, innovates, and adopts new structures, processes, and routines is part of the New 
Criminal Justice.  As such the current report presents a snapshot of gun violence reduction 
efforts in the city of Detroit, Michigan. 
To accomplish this, the report is divided into several topic areas.  First, an examination 
regarding the role criminal justice agencies can play violence reduction efforts is considered.  
Next, an outline of the nature of the project as implemented in Detroit is presented.   This is 
followed by a discussion of the implementation of the project in terms of routines and processing 
of gun cases that were established and the intensity and duration of those changes are assessed.  
Data on case processing were drawn from criminal justice records to gauge the nature and extent 
of changes in the local criminal justice landscape vis-à-vis gun violence processing. 
After the nature and extent of the intervention have been established, consideration of its 
impact on the problem at hand, namely gun violence, is the next issue under consideration.  To 
test for the effect that these changes had on gun violence, a series of intervention analyses were 
conducted to establish whether a significant reduction in gun violence was observed in the 
experimental area.   Timing of the intervention is drawn from the evaluation of changes in 
process in the handling and focus on gun cases in Northwest Detroit. 
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Chapter 1:   Program Theory/ Background 
 
 The problem of crime and the apparent ineffectiveness of criminal justice responses are 
not new (nothing works, KCPPE, 1974).  Much has been made of the fact that police alone may 
have limited effect on crime.  However, recently there have been promising results from 
interventions based upon an approach based that has become known as “strategic problem 
solving” (McGarrell, et.al, 2005).  This approach was the basis of Project Safe Neighborhoods 
upon which this initiative was based.  This approach typically involves a multi-agency 
collaborative effort involving an intelligence/data driven strategy focused on the most serious 
gun violence issues including specific individuals or groups as well as locations that are 
significantly involved with incidents of gun violence.  
 These initiatives built upon the foundation established by the Boston Ceasefire Project, 
Richmond’s Project Exile, and the Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative 
(SACSI) which was implemented in ten jurisdictions across the country.  Each of these 
approaches emphasized a multi-agency, intelligence driven approach.  Typically this model 
involved the selection of a specific target or intervention area that was of moderate size in which 
intensive and focused enforcement and prosecution activities were conducted along with the 
implementation of additional activities emphasizing community engagement and involvement.  
In addition, a media campaign was also conducted in many jurisdictions emphasizing prevention 
as well as deterrence messages.  In the SACSI model a research partner was also involved.  The 
research partner worked closely with the project task force to provide data analysis and 
information to determine patterns in gun violence incidents, develop strategies for targeting and 
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focusing the enforcement as well as intervention components, and monitor the progress and 
impact of these initiatives.   
 There were five core components that were central to the Project Safe Neighborhood 
Initiative:  
  Partnerships – In each district the PSN initiative was based on a collaborative 
program that was conducted through a partnership involving law enforcement and correctional 
(local and state) agencies, social service agencies, city or other local government, community 
organizations, and a research team.    
  Strategic Plan – The Project Safe Neighborhoods approach is based on a problem 
solving strategy in which the PSN core team designs the specific elements of their strategy to 
address gun violence through data analysis designed to identify the individuals, places, and 
groups that driving gun violence in the project area.  Ongoing data analysis is conducted 
throughout the implementation and operation of the various components of PSN in order to 
monitor the progress of the various components so that modifications can be made where and 
when such changes are needed. 
  Training - Another core aspect of Project Safe Neighborhoods was ongoing 
training for task forces to assist in the implementation of various project components.  These 
training opportunities were conducted across the country to allow members of local task forces to 
participate as a team representing their district.   
  Outreach – Both local and national outreach efforts were involved in Project Safe 
Neighborhoods.  Significant efforts were placed on a local outreach component to spread a 
deterrent message to potential offenders regarding the enhanced sanctions that awaited offenders 
through the use of a variety of local media.   
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  Accountability – Accountability was emphasized both in the sense of holding 
offenders accountable for their behavior as well as an overall project accountability in that 
participating districts were responsible for accounting for their implementation of processes and 
interventions in full accord with the Project Safe Neighborhoods model. 
 The implementation of Project Safe Neighborhoods in Detroit was consistent with this 
model.  A task force was formed representing all the principal local, state, and federal law 
enforcement agencies.  Overall leadership and coordination was provided through the US 
Attorney’s Office which played a central role in both the overall project leadership as well a 
major role in the prosecution of felons with firearms in federal court.   
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Chapter 2: The New Criminal Justice and Gun Violence Reduction in Detroit 
 
Criminal justice processes and routines vary across jurisdictions.  This is not a 
revolutionary observation, as Wilson (1968) hypothesized that political culture yielded variations 
in criminal justice structures.  In that work he identified three police styles of legalistic, 
watchman, and service approaches, linked to the larger political culture.   His student, Martin 
Levin, extended the consideration of political culture to the influence on how courts process 
individuals in different cities (Levin, 197x).  The idea that local criminal justice varies in its 
priorities and processes in the United States is now an area of theory and speculation (Duffee and 
Maguire, 2007).  
Recently, Klofas, McGarrell, and Hipple (2010) coined the term “the new criminal 
justice” to explore how recognition of local variation plays an important role in crafting solutions 
to problems in the local environment.  In this context, the current action research grant (TNCJ, 
2010 author: Mock) was launched to provide a working partnership between academics at 
Michigan State University and the local Detroit criminal justice system.  The principal agency in 
the project was the Detroit police department and partners included federal law enforcement 
(BATF, FBI), federal prosecution, Wayne county prosecution, and the community supervision 
(parole) personnel from the Michigan Department of Corrections.  Leadership and coordination 
of this project was provided by the US Attorney’s office.   
 
Implementing Project Safe Neighborhoods in Detroit 
The central element of the Project Safe Neighborhoods Initiative in Detroit was the case 
review process.  At the core of this project component was the principle that offenses with a 
firearm particularly those involving felons in possession of a firearm should be vigorously 
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enforced.   Prior to the initiation of Project Safe Neighborhoods in Detroit, this jurisdiction had 
participated in the Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI).  This 
precursor to PSN, implemented in ten jurisdictions across the country also had a focus on gun 
violence, however, through the PSN initiative there was a more systematic case review process 
established.  In this project component, all arrests involving a firearm in the target area were 
reviewed on a weekly basis.  This review was conducted by representatives from the US 
Attorney’s office, the local prosecutor’s office, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 
(ATF), and members of the enforcement team from local law enforcement agencies.  These 
individuals were assigned full time to the project from their respective local or state law 
enforcement agencies. In addition, there was an agent from ATF who was also assigned to work 
full time with this unit.  This group was responsible for gathering intelligence regarding 
individuals and groups in the target area and conducting enforcement actions aimed at disrupting 
drug selling in these neighborhoods and arresting and prosecuting those involved.  Although law 
enforcement agencies had worked cooperatively prior to this project, this initiative represented a 
greater level of cooperation and information sharing in that members of this unit were collocated 
and worked fulltime in this assignment over a considerable period of time.   
A meeting was held each week to discuss the arrests of the previous week.  These case 
review meetings involved a discussion of each of the arrests for a gun offense, typically a felon 
in possession of a firearm offense.  While a principal purpose of this discussion was to determine 
the most appropriate prosecution venue (state or federal), another important purpose was to 
exchange information and intelligence regarding the role of the arrestee with guns and gangs in 
the target area.  This meeting was attended by not only the local and federal prosecutors assigned 
to this group but by all members and supervisors of the enforcement unit. In addition, the 
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research partner attended these meetings on a regular basis.  Based on the discussion of these 
cases and the role of each arrestee in guns and gangs a prosecution venue was determined.   
In addition to determining the most appropriate prosecution venue, these meetings played 
a key role in determining future enforcement actions and strategies. An additional principal 
purpose of this discussion was to exchange intelligence about guns and gang activity in the target 
area.  One member of the task force was assigned the duty of interviewing each individual 
arrested for a gun offense in the target area.   From these interviews significant information and 
actionable intelligence was generated regarding the groups and individuals who were most 
involved in gang activity and gun violence in the target area.  This information formed the core 
of this intelligence driven intervention that was a cornerstone of the Project Safe Neighborhoods 
approach.   
These weekly meetings were attended by all members of the enforcement unit, including 
the intelligence officer and crime analyst, the research partner, along with the state and federal 
prosecutors who were assigned to this responsibility.  In addition, there was often a 
representative from the Department of Corrections at this meeting as well.  This individual 
contributed considerable information about individuals who were currently on parole in the 
target area who may either be involved with active gangs or who could provide information 
about active offenders and groups in the area.   
The agencies who were active participants in this project included the US Attorney’s 
Office, Eastern District of Michigan, the Wayne County Prosecutors Office, the Detroit Police 
Department, the Michigan Department of Corrections, and the School of Criminal Justice at 
Michigan State University.  In addition, there were community groups also involved including 
the Detroit Community Justice Partnership and Weed and Seed.   
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Case Review Summary and Analysis  
The primary and sustained effort to deal with gun carrying involved gun reviews which 
were most active from October 2006 through June of 2007.  To examine how processing 
changed in the Northwest District (NWD) we examined the treatment of cases of “carrying 
concealed weapons” (CCW) from 2006 and 2007 to capture the nature of the initiative in this 
period.  Local criminal justice changes of this sort are consistent with The New Criminal Justice 
outlined by Klofas, McGarrell, & Hipple (2010).   Individual cases were screened by a working 
group of Detroit police, local prosecutors and federal prosecutors. Details regarding the nature of 
this interaction are captured in the preceding qualitative discussion.   
Here we examine the cohort of CCW arrestees in 2006 and compare them with those 
apprehended in 2007 to offer some sense of the quality of criminal justice processing that 
changed across these periods.  If the program, when operational, was working as intended greater 
attention to the CCW issue in the NWD should have led to a tightening of the processing of these 
offenders.  For example, we would expect greater federal attention for some subset of cases and 
perhaps an increase in formal processing at the local level.   This is partially testable with a set of 
cases compared across the two years. 
The primary effect and vigor of the working group was identified as overlapping these 
two years (late 2006, most vigorous until approximately June 2007) but for tracking purposes the 
two years are examined separately as the awareness of CCW issues likely took some time to 
percolate into the criminal justice system processes and likewise it also is reasonable that the 
effort persisted for some period after the cessation of the most vigorous efforts in June 2007.  
This makes the comparison of 2006 cases with 2007 a defensible choice for analysis. 
Finally, an examination of those individuals who, in 2007, were identified for further 
Federal consideration are examined with regard to the seriousness of prior records and case 
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outcomes.  The identification of serious offenders for extensive consideration and special 
processing is part of the overall case review approach and those identified for consideration for 
federal prosecution should, on balance, represent serious offenders if the program is to be 
effective.  Knowledge of effective dose and duration, at this juncture, is sparse.  The theory 
behind the idea of focusing on serious offenders, however, is consistent with prior research and 
current policy recommendations (Wolfgang, Figlio & Sellin, 1972; Sherman & Martin, 1986, 
Sherman, 2011, c.f. Walker, 2004). 
 
Data Sources 
 In the following analyses, several data sources were search and merged to obtain the 
current perspective on CCW offenders and their prior records in the NWD.  First DPD arrest data 
were obtained for the two years and isolated for those arrestees in the NWD.  These data were 
then matched with the local court database known as CRIM.  This database indicates if charges 
were filed, when complete, what the final status of the case is in terms of outcome (trial, plea, 
conviction, etc.) and sentencing information.  Due to the separation of platforms across 
organization, the search process requires a case by case lookup approach. Additional information 
is gleaned from the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN) which will have a more 
expansive summary of prior arrests and convictions for each offender in the arrest database.  
Again, this entails an individual arrest history lookup process and data outside of the state of 
Michigan may be incomplete and data from within the state also may only be partially complete.   
Below we make some assumptions about cases not found in the various systems and the 
existence of clean records for those individuals (i.e., no prior arrests).  While this assumption 
may be weak in light of data issues just addressed, they present identical problems for any 
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process which seeks to determine prior records of individuals.  The inadequacy, flaws, and gaps 
in data collection are not understudy here, but is an issue for consideration in program execution 
relying on such information. 
CCW Arrestees in 2006 
The total number of CCW arrestees logged for 2006 in the NWD is 632. There were 13 
arrestees with more than one entry (determined by same last name, first name, middle name, and 
date of birth).  Five of the 13 arrestees with multiple entries have variable arrest dates (i.e., one 
arrest date earlier in the year and one later in the year).  Removal of these 8 duplicates reduces 
the number of CCW arrestees for 2006 to 624. 
 
Preliminary 2006 Case Flow 
Forty-six percent (n=286) of the 624 arrestees had accessible court information in CRIM.  
Charges were filed for these individuals and court proceedings were undertaken.  Dispositions 
for these individuals may include dismissals in addition to specified outcomes.  The remaining 
54% (n=338) were not found in CRIM.  We assume that these latter arrestees had their charges 
dropped since they were not found in CRIM. 
 
Criminal History.   
Criminal history record information was captured from two sources:  LEIN summaries 
from DPD departmental files and CRIM, a remote database that provides information on district 
and circuit court processing.  There were problems associated with these two data sources.  LEIN 
summaries provide information primarily on arrests.  Conviction information is often missing or 
has not yet been updated (pending court disposition information to the state police).  CRIM 
primarily provides conviction information.  Arrest information is not provided, but one can 
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assume that a prior conviction was associated with an arrest.  If charges were not filed in court, 
the court disposition information has not yet been updated, or if the court proceedings were 
outside of the local jurisdiction, the court information will not be available (and by implication 
either will the arrest associated with the court proceeding). 
Table 1 provides information on the criminal history background of the arrestees with 
CCW charges filed in court.  Seventeen percent of the arrestees had prior weapons arrests and 
16% had prior violent crime arrests.  Thirteen percent had prior weapons offense convictions, 
11% had prior drug offense convictions and 10% had prior violent offense convictions.  Ten 
percent of the arrestees had served a prior prison sentence and 9% had served a prior jail 
sentence.  The overall means for the criminal history backgrounds are low due to the inclusion of 
the entire population in the calculation of the mean (those with and without criminal history 
information).   
Table 2 presents criminal history information in collapsed categories.  Forty-two percent 
of the arrestees had at least one prior felony arrest, while the remaining 58% did not have prior 
felony arrests.  Thirty-two percent of the arrestees had at least one prior felony conviction. 
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Table 1:  Criminal History Backgrounds for 2006 Arrestees with Charges Filed (n=286). 
 Proportion 
of Total 
Overall Mean 
(s.d.) 
Minimum 
Values 
Maximum 
Values 
Violent Crime Arrests 16% .21 (.55) 0 3 
Violent Crime Convictions 10% .11 (.34) 0 2 
Property Crime Arrests 12% .17 (.55) 0 5 
Property Crime Convictions 9% .12 (.44) 0 4 
Drug Crime Arrests 14% .21 (.61) 0 5 
Drug Crime Convictions 11% .14 (.46) 0 4 
Weapons Crime Arrests 17% .20 (.48) 0 3 
Weapons Crime Convictions 13% .14 (.37) 0 2 
Misdemeanor Convictions 4% .05 (.25) 0 2 
Prior Prison Sentences 10% .13 (.41) 0 3 
Prior Jail Sentences 9% .13 (.42) 0 1 
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Table 2:  Criminal History Categories for 2006 Arrestees with Charges Filed (n=286). 
 Frequency Percent 
At Least One Felony Arrest 121 42% 
At Least One Felony Conviction 91 32% 
At Least One Misdemeanor Conviction 12 4% 
At Least One Prison Sentence 30 11% 
At Least One Jail Sentence 27 9% 
 
KEY:  At least one felony arrest/conviction is a combination of violent, property, drug, and 
weapon offense arrests/convictions. 
 
Case Disposition.  Tables 3 though 5 present information on the case disposition patterns and 
sentences arrestees: 
 Sixty-five percent of the arrestees pled guilty to their charges in court.  Eighteen percent 
of the arrestees had their charges dismissed via court proceedings and 6% were found 
guilty in a jury trial (from Table 3). 
 
 Consolidating the sentence types to the most serious type, the most frequently occurring 
sentence is probation (33% of total, 43% of adjusted total)1.  Prison is the next most 
frequently occurring sentence (20% of total, 27% of adjusted total), followed by jail (7% 
of total, 10% of adjusted total) and fines (6% of total, 8% of adjusted total) ( from Table 
4).   
                                                          
1 The consolidation strategy prohibits combinations or overlaps of sentences (e.g., probation plus fine, prison plus 
probation, etc.).  Instead, one sentence is given contingent upon the most serious sentence type in the combination.  
Prison is considered the most serious sentence and is followed by jail, probation, and fine in decreasing order of 
seriousness. 
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 In terms of the most serious sentence type, those who pled guilty or were found guilty by 
a bench trial were significantly more likely to receive a probation sentence.  A prison 
sentence was the next most frequently occurring sentence for those who pled guilty.  
Those who pled no contest or were found guilty by a jury trial were significantly more 
likely to receive a prison sentence.  All of those arrestees who pled no contest were 
sentenced to prison (from Table 5). 
 
 
Table 3:  Case Dispositions (n=286). 
 Frequency Percent 
Pled Guilty 186 65% 
Dismissed 51 18% 
Jury Trial – Guilty 18 6% 
Disposition Pending 11 4% 
Bench Trial – Guilty 7 2% 
Jury Trial – Not Guilty 5 2% 
Pled No Contest 4 1% 
Bench Trial – Not Guilty 3 1% 
Suspended 1 <1% 
NOTE:  disposition pending category is used to describe cases in which a disposition is lacking 
(cannot determine the conclusion of a trial or whether a plea was made). 
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Table 4:  Sentences by Most Serious Sentence Type (n=286). 
 Frequency Percent Adj Percent 
(n=215) 
Probation 93 33% 43% 
Prison 58 20% 27% 
Jail 21 7% 10% 
Fine 18 6% 8% 
Missing 96 34% (25) 12% 
NOTE:  categories by most serious sentence disposition, with prison being the most serious 
followed by jail, probation, and fine. 
Table 5:  Dispositions by Most Serious Sentence Type (n=215). 
 Probation Prison Jail Fine Missing 
Pled Guilty 86 (46%) 41 (22%) 21 (11%) 16 (9%) 22 (12%) 
Jury Trial – 
Guilty 
3 (17%) 12 (67%) 0 1 (6%) 2 (11%) 
Bench Trial 
– Guilty 
4 (57%) 1 (14%) 0 1 (14%) 1 (14%) 
Pled No 
Contest 
0 4 (100%) 0 0 0 
*differences across sentence types are statistically dependable p<.05. 
NOTE:  categories by most serious sentence disposition, with prison being the most serious 
followed by jail, probation, and fine.  Caution is needed with statistically dependable results in 
cells with null entries.  The difference may be more of a product of a null value than a true 
difference across sentence types. 
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The 2006 data can be most easily visualized as a flow chart, such as can be found in 
figures 1 and 2 below.  Here we observe case attrition in 2006 and the extensive charge dropping 
54% at the initial processing of cases from the NWD.  Put differently, 46% of the arrestees cases 
resulted in charges being filed.  If we remove the 11 pending cases we note that of the 275 cases 
processed, 215 resulted in sanctions, or about 1 in 3 of the total arrested for CCW.  It is 
interesting to note that this number compares with the 1/3 of arrestees that were identified with 
having prior felonies.  In 2006, however, there was not a focused effort in identifying arrestees 
with prior felonies for extensive processing.  So, although offenders with prior records received 
longer sentences, this approach was not systematically applied until the closing months of 2006. 
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2007 PSN CCW Reviewed Arrests 
The total number of PSN reviewed CCW arrestees logged for 2007 in the NWD is 583. 
There are 9 arrestees with more than one entry (determined by same last name, first name, 
middle name, and date of birth).  Eight of the 9 arrestees with multiple entries have variable 
arrest dates (i.e., one arrest date earlier in the year and one later in the year).  The remaining 
arrestee with multiple entries is simply a duplicate with the secondary arrest date capturing the 
same arrest date as the first.  Removal of the one clear duplicate reduced the number of PSN 
reviewed CCW arrestees for 2007 to 582. 
 
Preliminary 2007 Case Flow 
Fifty-nine percent (n=344) of the 582 arrestees had accessible court information in 
CRIM.  Charges were file and court proceedings were undertaken for these arrestees.  
Dispositions for these individuals may include dismissals in addition to specified outcomes.  The 
remaining 41% (n=238) were not found in CRIM.  We assume that these latter arrestees had their 
charges dropped since they were not found in CRIM.2 
Table 6 provides information on the criminal history background of the arrestees with 
CCW charges filed in court.  Twenty-one percent of the arrestees had prior weapons arrests and 
15% had prior violent crime arrests.  Ten percent had prior weapons offense convictions, 11% 
had prior drug offense convictions and 10% had prior violent offense convictions.  Twelve 
percent of the arrestees had served a prior prison sentence and 15% had served a prior jail 
                                                          
2 The same problems associated with these data sources in 2006 were found in 2007.  LEIN summaries provide 
information primarily on arrests.  Conviction information is often missing or has not yet been updated (pending 
court disposition information to the state police).  CRIM primarily provides conviction information.  Arrest 
information is not provided, but one can assume that a prior conviction was associated with an arrest.  If charges 
were not filed in court, the court disposition information has not yet been updated, or if the court proceedings were 
outside the local jurisdiction, the court information will not be available (and by implication either will the arrest 
associated with the court proceeding). 
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sentence. The overall means for the criminal history backgrounds are low due to the inclusion of 
the entire population in the calculation of the mean (those with and without criminal history 
information).   
Table 7 presents criminal history information in collapsed categories.  Forty-two percent 
of the arrestees had at least one prior felony arrest, while the remaining 58% did not have prior 
felony arrests.  Thirty percent of the arrestees had at least one prior felony conviction. 
 
 
Table 6:  Criminal History Backgrounds for 2007 Arrestees with Charges Filed (n=344). 
 Proportion 
of Total 
Overall Mean 
(s.d.) 
Minimum 
Values 
Maximum 
Values 
Violent Crime Arrests 15% .24 (.69) 0 7 
Violent Crime Convictions 10% .11 (.35) 0 2 
Property Crime Arrests 20% .31 (.80) 0 8 
Property Crime Convictions 13% .17 (.53) 0 5 
Drug Crime Arrests 18% .33 (.87) 0 7 
Drug Crime Convictions 11% .17 (.58) 0 5 
Weapons Crime Arrests 21% .28 (.65) 0 4 
Weapons Crime Convictions 10% .13 (.42) 0 3 
Misdemeanor Convictions 14% .18 (.48) 0 3 
Prior Prison Sentences 12% .19 (.64) 0 5 
Prior Jail Sentences 15% .19 (.50) 0 3 
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Table 7:  Criminal History Categories for 2007 Arrestees with Charges Filed (n=344). 
 Frequency Percent 
At Least One Felony Arrest 146 42% 
At Least One Felony Conviction 102 30% 
At Least One Misdemeanor Conviction 50 14% 
At Least One Prison Sentence 41 12% 
At Least One Jail Sentence 52 15% 
KEY:  At least one felony arrest/conviction is a combination of violent, property, drug, and 
weapon offense arrests/convictions. 
 
Case Disposition.  Tables 8 through 10 present information on the case disposition, and 
sentences for the arrestees: 
 
 Forty-two percent of the arrestees pled guilty to their charges in court.  Fifteen percent of 
the arrestees had their charges dismissed, 3% were found guilty in a jury trial, and an 
additional 3% were found guilty in a bench trial.  Thirty-four percent of the arrestees are 
awaiting a disposition (from Table 8). 
 
 Consolidating the sentence types to the most serious type, the most frequently occurring 
sentence is probation (16% of total, 33% of adjusted total)3.  Prison is the next most 
frequently occurring sentence (11% of total, 23% of adjusted total), followed by jail (6% 
                                                          
3 The consolidation strategy prohibits combinations or overlaps of sentences (e.g., probation plus fine, prison plus 
probation, etc.).  Instead, one sentence is given contingent upon the most serious sentence type in the combination.  
Prison is considered the most serious sentence and is followed by jail, probation, and fine in decreasing order of 
seriousness. 
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of total, 12% of adjusted total).  Only one arrestee received a fine when sentence types 
were consolidated into the most serious sentence type (from Table 9).   
 
 In terms of the most serious sentence type, as presented in table 10, all of those who pled 
no contest received a probation sentence.  Those who were found guilty by a bench trial 
were most likely to have received a probation sentence, while those who were found 
guilty by a jury trial were more likely to have received a prison sentence.  Those who 
pled guilty appear to be more likely to have received a probation or prison sentence (but 
there are a substantial proportion of the dispositions awaiting sentence information). 
 
 
Table 8:  Case Dispositions (n=344). 
 Frequency Percent 
Pled Guilty 146 42% 
Disposition Pending 118 34% 
Dismissed 53 15% 
Jury Trial – Guilty 10 3% 
Bench Trial – Guilty 10 3% 
Bench Trial – Not Guilty 3 1% 
Jury Trial – Not Guilty 2 1% 
Pled No Contest 2 1% 
NOTE:  disposition pending category is used to describe cases in which a disposition is lacking 
(cannot determine the conclusion of a trial or whether a plea was made). 
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Table 9:  Sentences by Most Serious Sentence Type (n=344). 
 Frequency Percent Adj Percent 
(n=168) 
Probation 55 16% 33% 
Prison 38 11% 23% 
Jail 20 6% 12% 
Fine 1 <1% 1% 
Missing 230 67% (54) 32% 
NOTE:  categories by most serious sentence disposition, with prison being the most serious 
followed by jail, probation, and fine. 
 
 
Table 10:  Dispositions by Most Serious Sentence Type (n=168). 
 Probation Prison Jail Fine Missing 
Pled Guilty 47 (32%) 32 (22%) 18 (12%) 1 (1%) 48 (33%) 
Jury Trial – 
Guilty 
1 (10%) 5 (50%) 1 (10%) 0 3 (30%) 
Bench Trial 
– Guilty 
5 (50%) 1 (10%) 1 (10%) 0 3 (30%) 
Pled No 
Contest 
2 (100%) 0 0 0 0 
NOTE:  categories by most serious sentence disposition, with prison being the most serious 
followed by jail, probation, and fine.   
 
Like the previous year’s CCW cases the 2007 data can be most easily visualized as a flow 
chart, such as can be found in figures 3 and 4 below.  Here we observe case attrition at the filing 
stage in 2007 is muted in the NWD, contemporaneous with the increased attention to CCW cases 
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provided by NWD working group of officers and county and federal prosecutors.  Charges were 
dropped or not pursued in 41% of arrests during the initial processing of cases from the NWD.  
Put differently, 59% of the arrestees cases resulted in charges being filed.  If we remove the 118 
pending cases we note that of the 226 cases processed, 168 resulted in sanctions, or about 3 in 10 
of the total arrested for CCW, and approximately 75% of the cases (excluding pending) which 
were processed resulted in some sanctions.   
The proportions receiving sanctions are comparable to those obtained in 2006, however, 
but the addition of federal prosecutions as a potential outcome in 2007 must also be addressed.  
Overall, processing of CCW offenders, once charges were filed, appeared relatively stable across 
the two periods (though at the time of analysis 118 pending cases requiring resolution requires 
some assumption that the outcomes of those cases will be similar to those decided). 
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Rather than changing an entire process that, in one section of Detroit apprehends 600 
people annually for criminal justice processing, the NWD working group focused on high impact 
individuals, with prior felony convictions, that could be eligible for federal prosecution.  This 
case review process does filter the whole of the case load, but much in the risk assessment mode 
of Sherman (2011) attempts to allocate the attention of the system on the more serious offenders.  
To illustrate this, we next turn attention to the federal processing and review of cases in 
the 2007 cohort.  It should be noted that among these arrestees those with one felony conviction 
represented 102 individuals or about 30% of the total against whom which charges were filed, 
and about 18% of the total number that were apprehended.  These cases would represent those 
ripe for review.  Below the federally reviewed cases are discussed.  
Federal Prosecution4 
Six percent of all 2007 arrestees were considered for federal prosecution in 2007 (n=33)5.  
Eighty-eight percent (n=29) of those considered for federal prosecution had accessible 
(preliminary) state court information in CRIM.  State charges were filed and state court 
proceedings were undertaken for these arrestees.  The remaining 12% (n=4) did not have 
(preliminary) state court information in CRIM.  This is not to say that all charges were dropped 
for these arrestees.  Rather, state charges were dropped and federal charges may have been 
pursued. 
Table 11 provides a comparison of criminal history backgrounds for arrestees with state 
charges filed and arrestees who are considered for federal prosecution.  For all of the criminal 
history categories, arrestees considered for federal prosecution have a higher proportion of 
                                                          
4 At the outset, it is important to note that information on arrestees considered for federal prosecution is rather 
limited.  Court information is gathered from CRIM, a remote database of state court proceedings.  Information on 
the federal prosecution of arrestees cannot be captured via CRIM. 
5 The total number of arrestees considered for federal prosecution is 34.  One arrestee was removed from the 
discussion due to the lack of identifying information.  This reduces the total to 33. 
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arrestees with a specified criminal history background and a higher average number of specified 
criminal history records.  Very simply, this means that a higher proportion of arrestees 
considered for federal prosecution had a specified criminal history record and their records were 
longer than those arrestees with state charges filed.  Significant differences were observed for 
every criminal history category with the exception of arrests and convictions for felony property 
offenses.   
Some of the more notable differences between the two groups are found for violent crime 
arrests and convictions, drug arrests and convictions, weapons arrests and convictions, and prior 
prison and jail sentences.  Fifty-nine percent of those considered for federal prosecution had 
prior drug arrests and 52% had prior violent felony convictions.  Comparatively, only 15% of 
arrestees with state charges filed had prior violent felony arrests and 7% had prior violent felony 
convictions.  Forty-five percent of those considered for federal prosecution had prior weapons 
arrests, 24% had prior weapons convictions, 31% had prior violent felony arrests, and 21% had 
prior violent felony convictions.  The proportion of arrestees with state charged filed having 
these criminal history backgrounds is dramatically lower:  19% had prior weapons arrests, 9% 
had prior weapons convictions, 13% had prior violent felony arrests, and 9% had prior violent 
felony convictions.  In terms of prior prison sentences, 38% of those considered for federal 
prosecution had served a prior prison sentence, while only 9% of those with state charges filed 
had served a prior prison sentence.    
 
Table 12 presents criminal history information in collapsed categories.  The differences 
become even more apparent.  Seventy-nine percent of arrestees considered for federal 
prosecution had at least one prior felony arrest compared with 39% of those arrestees with state 
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charges filed. It should be noted, again that in data systems with greater coverage, prior arrests 
and convictions not apparent from LEIN or CRIM might indicate more serious records, we 
assume the records gap is similar across the two samples.  Seventy-two percent of those 
considered for federal prosecution had at least one prior felony conviction according to data 
gleaned from CRIM and LEIN systems, while 26% of those with state charges filed had at least 
one felony conviction. 
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Table 11:  Criminal History Backgrounds 2007 Arrestees and Federal Considerations. 
 Arrestees with Charges 
Filed  
(n=315) 
Federal Considerations 
 
(n=29) 
 Proportion 
of Total 
Overall Mean 
(s.d.) 
Proportion 
of Total 
Overall Mean 
(s.d.) 
Violent Crime Arrests* 13% .21 (.67) 31% .52 (.87) 
Violent Crime Convictions* 9% .10 (.33) 21% .24 (.51) 
Property Crime Arrests 19% .29 (.78) 31% .52 (.95) 
Property Crime Convictions 13% .16 (.50) 17% .28 (.80) 
Drug Crime Arrests* 15% .23 (.67) 59% 1.38 (1.72) 
Drug Crime Convictions* 7% .10 (.43) 52% .90 (1.17) 
Weapons Crime Arrests* 19% .26 (.64) 45% .55 (.74) 
Weapons Crime Convictions* 9% .11 (.40) 24% .28 (.53) 
Misdemeanor Convictions* 12% .16 (.46) 38% .45 (.63) 
Prior Prison Sentences* 9% .15 (.53) 38% .72 (1.28) 
Prior Jail Sentences* 14% .17 (.47) 31% .41 (.68) 
*differences in proportion with specified criminal history and mean arrest/conviction history 
records are statistically dependable p<.05. 
NOTE:  The overall means for the criminal history backgrounds are low due to the inclusion of 
the entire population in the calculation of the mean (those with and without criminal history 
information).   
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Table 12:  Criminal History Categories for 2007 Arrestees and Federal Considerations. 
 Arrestees with 
Charges Filed 
(n=315) 
Federal 
Considerations 
(n=29) 
At Least One Felony Arrest* 39% 79% 
At Least One Felony Conviction* 26% 72% 
At Least One Misdemeanor Conviction* 12% 38% 
At Least One Prison Sentence* 9% 38% 
At Least One Jail Sentence* 14% 31% 
*differences in proportion with specified criminal history records are statistically dependable 
p<.05. 
KEY:  At least one felony arrest/conviction is a combination of violent, property, drug, and 
weapon offense arrests/convictions. 
 
Case Disposition.  Table 13 presents information on the state court case disposition and 
sentences for 2007 CCW arrestees under federal consideration. It is important to note that state 
court dispositions and sentences should not be found.  These arrestees were under consideration 
for federal prosecution.  The finding of state court dispositions and sentences indicates that 
federal prosecution was not undertaken.  It is also important to take caution in interpreting the 
statistics on the arrestees under consideration for federal prosecution.  The number of arrestees is 
small and the processing of arrestees though state court is even smaller.  Statistics based upon 
small sample sizes may be unreliable. 
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 Forty-five percent of the arrestees under consideration for federal prosecution had their 
charges dismissed.  It is assumed (and verified) that arrestees whose charges were 
dismissed in state court were dismissed with the intention of federal prosecution.  
Twenty-eight percent of the arrestees pled guilty to state charges, 1 arrestee was found 
guilty in state court to a jury trial, and 1 arrestee was found not guilty in a state court jury 
trial.  The remaining 28% are pending disposition, which may or may not subsequently 
proceed through the state court (from Table 13). 
 Consolidating the sentence types to the most serious type, the most frequently occurring 
sentence is prison (14% of total, 44% of adjusted total).  Probation is the only other 
sentence type, with 3 arrestees (10% of total, 33% of adjusted total) receiving a probation 
sentence (from Table 14).   
 
Table 13:  Case Dispositions (n=29). 
 Frequency Percent 
Dismissed 13 45% 
Pled Guilty 8 28% 
Disposition Pending 6 21% 
Jury Trial – Guilty 1 3% 
Jury Trial – Not Guilty 1 3% 
NOTE:  disposition pending category is used to describe cases in which a disposition is lacking 
(cannot determine the conclusion of a trial or whether a plea was made). 
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Table 14:  Sentences by Most Serious Sentence Type (n=29). 
 Frequency Percent Adj Percent (n=9) 
Prison 4 14% 44% 
Probation 3 10% 33% 
Missing 22 76% (2) 22% 
NOTE:  categories by most serious sentence disposition, with prison being the most serious 
followed by jail, probation, and fine. 
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Consistent with the expectations of the PSN initiative, the prior record of those 
considered for review was substantially more serious than the records of those arrestees available 
from local criminal justice databases.  The gap between the felony requirement and what the 
local databases indicate likely reflects that the federal prosecutors had a larger array of prior 
history data upon which to draw, since a felony conviction was a requirement for federal 
prosecution for CCW cases as Felon in Possession cases.   
The small number of cases upon which scrutiny and processing was directed, again, 
reflects the idea of concentrating resources and efforts on the highest risk individuals.  Here the 
comparison indicates that this was statistically verified as an element of the process.  Similarly 
the impact of the program on the population of offenders in the local database appears to have 
removed them via dismissals from processing in the local courts.   
Below a comparison between the 2006 and 2007 cohorts is executed to revisit the 
question of how the larger population of CCW arrestees was handled under the change.  Were a 
greater proportion sent to prison?  Did a greater number of arrests yield charges?  These and 
related questions direct attention to systemic changes that may have operated contemporaneously 
with reviews, inasmuch as the CCW cases may have received a greater level of overall attention, 
beyond the Federal consideration directed at the 33 individuals discussed above.   
 
Comparing Outcomes:  2006 CCW Arrests and 2007 PSN CCW Reviewed Arrests 
 
Charges Filed.  Arrestees subjected to PSN CCW reviews were significantly more likely to have 
their charges filed in court, while the comparison group of 2006 CCW arrestees were more likely 
to have their charges dropped (from Table 15).  This is consistent with greater scrutiny of cases 
for consideration in 2007. 
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Table 15:  Comparison of Charges Filed and Dropped. 
 Charges Filed Charges Dropped Total 
2006 Arrestees 286 (46%) 338 (54%) 624 
2007 Arrestees 344 (59%) 238 (41%) 582 
*differences are statistically dependable, p<.05 
 
Dispositions.   There are significant differences between arrestees subjected to PSN CCW 
reviews and the comparison group of 2006 CCW arrestees in the proportion of arrestees who 
pled guilty, were found guilty by jury trial, and those whose disposition is pending.  A higher 
proportion of 2006 CCW arrestees pled guilty (65%) or were found guilty by jury trial (6%).  A 
much higher proportion of PSN CCW reviewed arrestees are awaiting a case disposition (34%), 
relative to the comparison group of 2006 CCW arrestees (4%).  There were no significant 
differences for the remaining case dispositions (from Table 16).   
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Table 16:  Comparison of Dispositions. 
 2006 Arrestees with 
Charges Filed 
 (n=286) 
2007 Arrestees with 
Charges Filed 
(n=344) 
Pled Guilty* 65% 42% 
Pled No Contest 1% 1% 
Jury Trial – Guilty* 6% 3% 
Bench Trial - Guilty 2% 3% 
Jury Trial – Not Guilty 2% 1% 
Bench Trial – Not Guilty 1% 1% 
Suspended  <1% 0 
Disposition Pending* 4% 34% 
Dismissed 18% 15% 
*differences are statistically dependable, p<.05. 
 
Table 17 provides a comparison of sentence types after removing the missing and/or 
pending sentence information category from the overall sample.  With the exception of fines, 
there are no significant differences in sentence types between arrestees subjected to PSN CCW 
reviews and the comparison group of 2006 CCW arrestees.  The missing and/or pending 
sentence information which is large in the 2007 cohort, is associated with federal consideration, 
so the exclusion create an issue of comparability if the most serious offenders are removed.  
With that caution in mind, based on this observation, the only difference between the two groups 
processing appears in relation to fines.  A higher proportion of 2006 CCW arrestees received a 
fine (9%), relative to arrestees subjected to PSN CCW reviews.   
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There were no significant differences between the two groups with regard to the average 
sentence length for prison sentences, jail sentences, and probation sentences.  Additionally, there 
were no significant differences in terms of the average fine amount.  While the comparison group 
seems to have a higher proportion of arrestees who received a fine as a sentence, the average fine 
was approximately the same for both groups (from Table 18).   
Once the missing and/or pending sentence information category was excluded, the only 
significant difference between the two groups is the proportion of arrestees receiving a fine as a 
sentence (from Table 19).  Analyses not shown indicate further that there were no significant 
differences between the two groups with regard to the average sentence length or fine amount.   
Table 17:  Comparison of Sentence Types with Removal of Missing/Pending. 
 2006 Arrestees with 
Charges Filed 
(n=190) 
2007 Arrestees with 
Charges Filed 
(n=114) 
Prison 15% 17% 
Prison Plus Probation 1% 0 
Prison Plus Fine 13% 15% 
Prison Probation Fine 1% 1% 
Jail 3% 3% 
Jail Plus Probation <1% 1% 
Jail Plus Fine 5% 9% 
Jail Probation Fine 3% 4% 
Probation 7% 4% 
Probation Plus Fine 42% 44% 
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Fine* 9% 1% 
*differences between groups are statistically dependable, p<.05. 
Table 18:  Comparison of Sentences by Sentence Type (Allowing Overlap in Sentences). 
 2006 Arrestees with Charges 
Filed 
2007 Arrestees with Charges 
Filed 
 N Mean (sd) N Mean (sd) 
Prison sentence     
     Lower yrs 58 2.72 (3.88) 38 2.69 (2.37) 
     Upper yrs 58 3.99 (7.92) 38 4.84 (5.36) 
     Mean yrs 58 3.35 (5.77) 38 3.77 (3.65) 
Jail Sentence     
     Days 21 79.90 (69.43) 20 104.50 (79.65) 
Probation 
sentence 
    
     Years 103 1.58 (.76) 62 1.52 (.69) 
Fine     
     Amount 140 $737.09 
(265.17) 
84 $796.61 
(464.91) 
 
 
Table 19:  Comparison of Sentence Types (By Most Serious Sentence) with Removal of 
Missing/Pending. 
 2006 Arrestees with 
Charges Filed (n=190) 
2007 Arrestees with 
Charges Filed (n=114) 
Prison 30% 33% 
Jail 11% 17% 
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Probation 49% 48% 
Fine* 9% 1% 
*differences between groups are statistically dependable, p<.05. 
Conclusions 
Implementation failure and net widening are two issues that have beguiled criminal 
justice interventions.  Programs that are aimed at particularly serious offenders often ensnare less 
serious offenders and “widen the net”.  A larger idea associated with policy initiatives is 
implementation failure, which could have many sources such as not following through on 
required program elements, in this case sanctions.  For example, mandatory arrest policies, when 
carefully scrutinized, routinely indicate adherence to the policy has substantial slippage, even 
under experimental conditions (e.g., Sherman and Berk, 1981).   
This chapter has provided an empirical examination of the processing in the NWD during 
the time the working group was most active in reviewing cases for PSN processing at the federal 
level.  Did the processing of CCWs change significantly during this period and result in a 
substantially wider net?  The comparison of 2006 and 2007 CCW arrestees indicated that the 
probability of charges being filed did substantially rise across the two years.  Formal charges 
were pursued in 46% of cases in 2006 and that rose to 59% of cases in 2007 most likely due to 
the attention that CCWs received during this period and the close working relationship between 
the police and prosecutors on a case by case basis.   This outcome might suggest net widening 
occurred at this point, but the analysis of case processing routines once charges were filed 
indicate that sentencing outcomes for individuals as an overall cohort were little changed.  This 
suggests that the system worked on the modal CCW cases in a comparable fashion across the 
two periods. 
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With respect to the implementation of the program, a prior section of this report has 
detailed the functioning of the working group.  In this chapter we have detailed the relative rarity 
(33 of 582) of federal consideration for an individual and the seriousness of the prior record of 
the individuals who received this consideration relative to their CCW arrestee peers.  This is an 
indication of a rigor of review, consistent with the goal of identifying (at least with regard to 
prior record) serious offenders. 
 
This chapter has provided a quantification of what has happened to the general 
population of CCW arrestees over two periods.  The next question to consider is, did the change 
in processing detailed here and in previous sections of this report yield a decline in gun violence 
during the observed period of higher attention to CCW cases?   
It seems plausible to consider two mechanisms which may have been at work.  First, a 
general (and specific for those caught, punished, but in the community) deterrent effect may have 
been communicated to those who would carry guns.  Dissuading some potential illegal gun 
carriers from engaging in this activity should yield a decline in gun violence as opportunities are 
reduced.  A second potential mechanism to consider is whether gun violence was reduced by 
incapacitation.  If the individuals given federal consideration represent a particularly active and 
serious offender pool, their removal from the NWD could also result in a detectable decline in 
gun violence.  Discerning the deterrent and incapacitation effects is not possible, but both predict 
a decline in crime if the program was successful identifying, apprehending, and prosecuting 
serious offenders and communicating that message broadly to the pool of citizens who carry 
illegal firearms in the NWD.  This question is addressed as we study the impact of the PSN 
working group on crime in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3:  The effect of gun violence reduction efforts on gun violence 
The effectiveness of criminal justice innovations is often questionable.  For example, 
there is a fair debate about the impact of community oriented policing on crime (Worrall/Zhang 
debate).  Disentangling the effectiveness of programs and gauging their outcome relative to other 
actions is an essential part of criminal justice research.  The preceding chapters have documented 
a gun-offender approach that was implemented in Detroit, MI for slightly less than one year.  
The implementation of a new processing routine for gun offenses, including collaborative 
investigations, using federal prosecution of felons with guns as a possibility and having 
corrections supervision augmented for gun offenders on parole in the Northwest District were all 
part of the effort.  Whether those objectives were met has been established in previous chapters, 
and case processing routines changed over time and parolees were subjected to greater scrutiny. 
Nevertheless, if criminal justice agencies do effectively change their routines, even if it is 
transitory and not permanent, one of the important questions is: Did the change affect public 
safety?  In this instance greater scrutiny of gun parolees and greater attention to those carrying 
guns in the Northwest district would be expected to have a net negative effect on gun violence in 
that geographic area.  There is little reason to believe that the effect would extend far beyond the 
Northwest district.  As such this chapter takes up the question:  What impact, if any, did the PSN 
project have on gun violence? 
Measuring gun violence 
Detroit’s six districts recorded non-fatal shootings and homicides in a database which 
captured the district in which each shooting or homicide occurred.  Data were recorded for each 
gunshot victim in a consistent format from January 1, 2006 through the week of March 23, 2008.  
Those data were filtered by date and location to create a weekly total of shooting victimizations 
 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
55 
 
in each of the six districts.  Since the Eastern district, which has a history of high levels of gun 
violence,  adopted a PSN-like program during portions of the observation periods, it is excluded 
as a control site.  The gun-focused projected was adopted partially during the Northwest District 
intervention period and continued into the post-intervention period.  As such, the Eastern district 
was excluded from the analyses below.  It should be noted, that, in separate analyses of the 
Eastern District, there was a detectable and marginally significant decline in the number of 
shootings in that district.  Since the project did not closely follow the implementation of the gun 
violence reduction effort there, it is difficult to pinpoint the commencement and cessation of that 
intervention.  Therefore we chose to exclude it analyses presented here, since it was not a pure 
control site and the intervention period was not well defined. 
A total of 117 weekly observations were recorded for each district.  Thirty-nine weeks in 
the period from   October 1, 2006- June 30, 2007 represent the intervention period, where 
processing routines changed significantly in the Northwest District.  The 39 weeks from  January 
1, 2006 through the week of September 24, 2006 represent observations prior to the PSN 
intervention.  The period from July 1, 2007 to March 23, 2008 represents 39 post PSN 
observations. 
Thus there are three periods for the study, a pre-intervention, intervention, and post-
intervention period.  Given the three periods we approach the PSN intervention’s effect on 
shootings in several ways.  First, simple descriptive help describe the mean levels of gun 
violence in the intervention and four non-intervention districts during the entire period.  Second, 
t-tests comparing the means across periods for each district offer an initial examination about 
whether there are significant differences in the Northwest District and whether there were other 
declines that coincide with the Northwest District changes.  Finally, we run a series of Auto-
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Regressive Moving Average (ARIMA) models to ensure that trends in the data are not distorting 
the statistical inferences drawn regarding the impact of the PSN project in the Northwest District. 
 
Fatal and Non-Fatal Shootings a Descriptive Analysis 
The data in table 20 indicate that the Northwest district had the highest mean level of 
weekly shooting victims during the 117 weeks, at 6.15 per week.  The West and Southwest 
districts had the next highest levels of shootings with means of 5.91 and 5.18 respectively.  The 
Northeast district had a mean level of 4.64 weekly shootings, and the Central district had the 
lowest mean level of weekly shootings with a 2.29 average.  The level of gun violence in 
Northwest District is quite distinct inasmuch as, during the 117 weeks of observation there were 
no weeks with zero shootings.  All other districts exhibited weeks with no shootings, though only 
the Central district had more than 5 weeks out of the 117 with no recorded shootings. 
Table 20: Full sample statistics for five districts weekly shootings (N=117) 
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Northwest 1 17 6.15 2.97 
Central 0 9 2.29 1.88 
West 0 16 5.91 3.45 
Southwest 0 14 5.18 2.98 
Northeast 0 13 4.64 2.86 
 
    
 The data presented in table 21 subdivide the weekly mean shooting levels into the three 
periods under study, that is the pre-PSN period, the PSN intervention period, and the post-PSN 
period.  These three periods offer contrasts in terms of the levels of shootings and gun homicides 
recorded across all five Detroit districts.  The Northwest district, where the PSN project was 
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implemented, experienced a reduction of more about 1.4 shooting victimizations per week for 
the 39 weeks during the intervention, when compared with the pre-intervention period.  More 
simply, in the 39 intervention weeks there were about 156 fewer shooting victims than in the 
preceding 39 week period.  When compared with the 39 weeks after PSN activities wound down 
in the district, we observe that the intervention period had approximately .6 shooting 
victimizations fewer than the post-PSN comparison period.  Thus in terms of victimization 
differences between those two periods, we observe about 24 less shootings in the intervention 
period when compared with the 39 week post intervention period.   By comparison, the other 
precincts examined as controls appear to have trended downward across all three periods.  This 
pattern makes it difficult to discern whether an overall city-wide trend of decline was at work, or 
if the PSN intervention had a unique and distinguishable effect in the Northwest district.  Below, 
a series of t-tests explore whether weekly mean-levels had statistically significant variation 
across the observed periods. 
 
 
Table 21: Weekly Descriptive Statistics for Pre, Intervention, and Post Observations Series 
 Pre-PSN (N=39) PSN Intervention (N=39) Post-PSN (N=39) 
 Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
Northwest 2 17 6.87 3.04 1 11 5.46 2.59 2 14 6.10 3.15 
Central 0 9 2.51 1.92 0 8 2.44 2.02 0 6 1.92 1.69 
West 1 13 6.33 3.31 0 16 5.72 3.51 0 15 5.67 3.56 
Southwest 1 13 5.67 3.17 1 11 5.28 2.70 0 14 4.59 3.02 
Northeast 1 13 5.79 3.21 0 12 4.15 2.47 0 11 3.97 2.56 
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Consistent with the patterns observed in the descriptive statistics, a series of t-tests, 
reported in table 23, confirm that the decline in fatal and non-fatal gun victimizations was 
statistically significant (p<.05) in the Northwest district.  Declines occurred across all four 
control areas as well, however, only the Northeast district experienced a statistically significant 
decline among the control areas.  The increase in gunshot woundings and gun homicides in the 
post-PSN period, which occurred in the Northwest District, is unique, as the other four areas 
continued on a general downward trend.  Such a return to pre-intervention levels is consistent 
with Sherman (1990) and other’s speculation about the nature of intense police efforts that are 
consistent with crackdowns (e.g., Smith, 2003).  However, in this case, the processing routine 
adopted by PSN was much more individual and gun violence focused, but the analogy to a 
crackdown and the eventual decay back to pre-intervention levels is consistent with these 
preliminary results. The explanation for the decline in the Northeast district is not clear.     
Table 23: T-test comparisons across periods 
District Pre-PSN  / PSN 
Intervention 
Comparison T-testa 
 PSN Intervention /Post-
PSN 
Comparison T-test 
Northwest 2.21 (-1.41) -.981 (+.64) 
Central .17 (-.07) 1.21 (-.51) 
West .80 (-.61) .06(-.05) 
Southwest .58 (-.38) 1.07 (-.69) 
Northeast 2.53 (-1.64) .32(-.75) 
a Obtained t-test value reported, mean difference in parentheses 
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A thorough exploration of the effect of the PSN effort on crime in the Northwest district 
must take into account the fact that the data represent a sequence of time-series of observations.  
Time-series data require special care, as autocorrelated errors, that is the lack of independence 
across observations over time, may lead one to erroneous statistical inferences regarding the 
changes in gun violence observed across the three periods.  To accommodate the possibility of 
autocorrelated errors, the use of Auto-Regressive, Integrated, Moving Average (ARIMA) models 
is suggested for the study of interventions such as those observed in this analysis. 
Since the analyses deal with data arrayed over time, this technique must be used to 
control for variation that is systematically embedded in the series, to ensure that inferences are 
accurate.  This essentially requires the fitting of a statistical model to the data in order to control 
for the systematic variation inherent in much time series data.  To accomplish this the 
Identification, Estimation, and Diagnosis process outlined by McCleary and Hay (1980:91-103; 
See also, Box and Jenkins, 1976) will be adopted to pre-whiten the series for analysis and 
determine whether the intervention was associated with a significant decline in shooting 
victimization during the period when the project was actively being worked on by the program 
participants.   
The Identification process associated with ARIMA analyses establishes what, if any, 
trend pattern such as a moving average or autoregressive component must be included in the 
model to address systematic components of the observations that are associated with time-
components.  Once a model has been identified it is possible to turn the time series into the 
necessary “white noise” model that is suitable for analyses. 
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The intervention component used in a time series can represent several different types of 
changes, abrupt permanent change, temporary change, and gradual changes in a series are 
possible.  An abrupt and permanent change, for example, might be associated with an on-going 
intervention that covers a time series from a particular point all the way until the last observation.  
In the present case, 39 pre-intervention, 39 intervention, and 39 post-intervention weeks are 
observed.  Given this set up we have a switching pattern of no intervention, 
treatment/intervention, and no intervention.  Thus it is expected that we should, theoretically, 
observe an abrupt but temporary change in the gun violence patterns in the Northwest Detroit 
area. 
To model this, a dummy variable, coded 0 for no intervention active, and 1 for weekly 
observations that occur during the PSN intervention, is necessary to capture the differences in 
mean levels of violence between the PSN and non-PSN periods.  The logic behind this coding is 
illustrated in figure 1 below.  If the PSN period, net of systematic time-series components, has a 
significant impact on crime, we would expect that the sign to be associated with the dummy 
variable capturing the intervention to be negative.  Given that there is a directional hypothesis, 
we will use a one-tailed test of statistical significance in discern whether the decline in shootings 
is significantly different from zero during the intervention period in the Northwest District.  All 
other comparisons estimated on control districts will be two-tailed tests. 
 
Figure 1.  Coding pattern for intervention analysis. 
|----------PRE- PSN --------------|-------------- PSN ----------------| ---------------Post PSN ------------
----| 
 00000000000000000000000011111111111111111111111000000000000000000000000000 
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The first step in analysis is to examine autocorrelation functions (ACFs) and compare 
decay patterns in those functions with those typically associated with moving average 
components and autocorrelation components in the ARIMA model.  More simply, a prior 
realization of the series may have an immediate and quickly dying out impact on the next 
observation, which would denote a moving average component must be included.   Alternatively, 
one may see an immediate and slowly decaying relationship between successive observations in 
the series, which is an indicator of auto-regressive components at work.  Once these systematic 
components have been removed from the series, estimation can proceed and the impact of the 
policy change can be estimated.  If a series contains no systematic component, then OLS 
regression with the dummy variable indicator is an adequate approach to specifying the 
magnitude and significance of the impact obtained during the intervention period.   Since the 
data are arrayed in a weekly format, ACFs were computed for 52 weeks to explore patterns in the 
lag structure.  ACFs  are for the initial identification step are in the chapter appendix.   A 
summary of intervention analyses for the six districts are presented in table 24. 
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Table 24: Intervention Analysis for PSN, N=117 weekly observations of Fatal and non-Fatal 
Gunshot wounds 
District  Model / 
significance of 
fit 
PSN 
Intervention 
effect (Z/t 
statistic) 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller 
Northwest ARIMA, 
MA(3) p=.06 
-0.981  
(-1.36) 
-2.39 0.42 -10.52 
Northwest OLS                       
p=.07 
-1.02  
(-1.78)* 
-2.17 0.12 -- 
Central OLS 
p=.56 
0.22  
(0.59) 
-.52 0.95 -10.22 
West OLS 
p=.68 
-0.28   
(-0.42) 
-1.62 1.06 -9.52 
Southwest ARIMA, 
AR(3) 
p=.14 
0.37 
(0.52) 
-1.03 1.78 -9.08 
Northeast ARIMA, 
AR(11) 
p=.03 
-0.70  
(-1.02) 
-2.05 0.64 -9.34 
*p< .05, one-tailed test 
 Since the Northwest district change is of primary concern we modeled the intervention 
using ARIMA and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models.  This approach accounted 
for the fact that the ARIMA component was not statistically significant in the ARIMA model, 
but suggested by the diagnosis of the series and its autocorrelation function.  The differences 
between the models’ estimated intervention effects are not large, but both are presented for 
consideration.  The PSN intervention had a negative and marginally significant impact on weekly 
gunshot victimizations in the Northwest District.  For the 39 week period, ARIMA and OLS 
models indicate a reduction of approximately 1 shooting per week.  The models fit as measured 
by F-statistics (OLS) and chi-square statistics (ARIMA) indicates that the overall models did not 
meet conventional standards for statistical fit (.05), but would be within more a more liberal 
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definition of statistical significance.  For example, if we consider only the OLS estimate for the 
intervention, we find a t=-1.78, given a one-tailed statistical test, we would find the coefficient 
associated with the effect to be within the bounds of conventional statistical significance.  
Nevertheless, the weakness of the model fit should not be overestimated.  The estimation of 
changes in four other districts allows for the effect to be contextualized.  In no other district is an 
effect obtained that is even marginally significant.  In both the Central and Southwest districts, 
the gunshot victimizations increased slightly during the 39 week intervention period (by .22 and 
.37 shootings per week, respectively).  In the Northeast and West districts, declines in shootings 
were observed during the 39 weeks (.70 and .28 shootings per week declines, respectively).  
Again, none of the control districts experienced statistically significant changes in gunshot 
victimizations.  The model for the Northeast was significant (p=.03), but that was largely due to 
the ARIMA component estimated and not the intervention coefficient.  The coefficient of -.70 
for the Northeast comes closest to that estimated for the Northwest district (-.98). 
The conclusion that can be drawn, cautiously, from the preceding analyses is that the PSN gun 
intervention, observed for 39 weeks, had a small, but significant effect in reducing gun violence 
in that location.  There is no clear pattern of contemporaneous change in the other four districts.  
This suggests that there was a decline in gunshot victimization in the Northwest during the 
period when the PSN project was most active in intercepting guns on the street and local and 
federal agencies were working together on case reviews.  Given the immense costs of gun 
victimizations in terms of medical, economic, and psychological costs a reduction of one event 
per week would yield an overall reduction of approximately 39 cases during the period or, 52 per 
year if the program were sustained and had a constant and similar impact.  For example, if we 
draw on Cook and colleagues estimate that medical costs for a gunshot victimization is $17,000 
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(these estimates are more than a decade old and are not adjusted for inflation) the we would 
estimate medical treatment cost savings of $663,000 for the 39 weeks and if the program were to 
continue, sustained for one year, it would yield $884,000 reduction in medical costs.  Again, 
these numbers are based on an old estimate of costs and are probably a floor of “savings” that 
could be identified. 
The problem of sustaining and maintaining the intensity of interventions is clearly an issue, but 
in a time of shrinking public budgets and local police force personnel cuts, the findings from 
Detroit are more generalizable, since that city has been in economic difficultly throughout the 
study period.   
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Chapter 4: Conclusions 
 
The conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis and report are quite tentative.  First, 
the implementation of a rigorous and real change to the criminal justice processing in Detroit 
appears to have had a very short duration and the intensity of case processing appears to have 
been limited as well.  Similarly, data drawn from parole points to, again, a change in processing, 
but the measures that correspond to that change appear to have a longer duration, but very low 
and perhaps no intensity from the records drawn from the Department of Corrections.  Given 
these observations, it would be surprising to find a substantial programmatic impact on gun 
violence in the Northwest District of Detroit.  The evidence points to a small reduction, but the 
high gun crime East district also experienced a substantial reduction with no such change in 
routine processing. 
What can be made of the findings?  First, they are disheartening in the sense that program 
implementation in a criminal justice system undergoing financial stress, unstable leadership, and 
substantial personnel transfers and attrition is quite difficult.  Such an environment, 
unfortunately, is likely to characterize many police agencies in the coming years as attrition and 
layoffs threaten organizational stability.   In the context of this organizational instability, only a 
brief intervention was detectable from onsite observations and from data collection and analysis 
efforts.  However, this short and limited change in processing coincided with a significant 
decrease in shootings in the intervention area.    
While this is a promising result for such interventions, it should be noted that another 
similar district not involved in this initiative experienced a decline in gun violence during the 
period of study.  It is not known if this could have been related to the intervention through a 
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spillover effect (although the areas were not adjacent) or if it was a part of the routine fluctuation 
in gun violence. The potential impact on gun crime through such an intervention may be best 
realized if such interventions can be implemented and maintained in a consistent manner with a 
sufficient level of intensity to make a difference.   
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